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Towards Moral Machines: 
A Discussion with Michael Anderson 
and Susan Leigh Anderson
Abstract
At the turn of the 21st century, Susan Leigh Anderson and Michael Anderson conceived and 
introduced the Machine Ethics research program, that aimed to highlight the requirements 
under which autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) systems could demonstrate ethical 
behavior guided by moral values, and at the same time to show that these values, as 
well as ethics in general, can be representable and computable. Today, the interaction 
between humans and AI entities is already part of our everyday lives; in the near future it 
is expected to play a key role in scientific research, medical practice, public administration, 
education and other fields of civic life. In view of this, the debate over the ethical behavior 
of machines is more crucial than ever and the search for answers, directions and regulations 
is imperative at an academic, institutional as well as at a technical level. Our discussion 
with the two inspirers and originators of Machine Ethics highlights the epistemological, 
metaphysical and ethical questions arising by this project, as well as the realistic and 
pragmatic demands that dominate artificial intelligence and robotics research programs. 
Most of all, however, it sheds light upon the contribution of Susan and Michael Anderson 
regarding the introduction and undertaking of a main objective related to the creation of 
ethical autonomous agents, that will not be based on the “imperfect” patterns of human 
behavior, or on preloaded hierarchical laws and human-centric values.
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Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: Susan, Michael, thank you very 
much for the opportunity to discuss such an interesting issue with you. It 
is our great pleasure and honor to be able to share with our readers and 
the academic community in Greece and internationally this exceptional 
conversation. The rapid technological developments of recent years and 
what the immediate future holds for us bring your work to the forefront of 
every discussion about AI and Machine Ethics. Building an ethical machine, 
a possibility that perhaps a few years ago looked like a sci-fi scenario, today 
seems like an imperative and urgent demand. This seems to be the main 
objective of your work. 
Susan Leigh & Michael Anderson: Thank you for giving us the opportunity 
to discuss our work in the context of current issues of artificial intelligence!
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: You introduced the Machine Ethics 
research program about seventeen years ago.1 What is the purpose of 
Machine Ethics and what distinguishes Machine Ethics from the rest of the 
AI Ethics field? Why is Machine Ethics still important? We are now at the 
beginning of 2021. Seventeen years later, what is your assessment regarding 
the evolution of this program?
Susan Leigh Anderson: The main purpose of the Machine Ethics program 
is to ensure that autonomous AI systems behave in an ethical fashion when 
interacting with human beings. Secondarily, I believe that it gives us a chance 
to become clearer about ethics – how to represent its building blocks, 
resolve contradictions, and come up with principles that should guide the 
actions of systems functioning in particular domains – that, hopefully, will 
inspire us to behave better.
Michael Anderson: When we first conceived the idea of Machine Ethics at 
the turn of the century, the prevailing thinking was that such a notion was 
still firmly in the realm of science fiction and would remain there for the 
foreseeable future. This attitude stemmed from a myopic view of the types 
1 Michael Anderson, Suzan Leigh Anderson, and Chris Armen, “Towards Machine Ethics,” in 
Proceedings of the AAAI-04 Workshop on Agent Organizations: Theory and Practice, 53-59 
(San Jose, CA, 2004); Michael Anderson, Suzan Leigh Anderson, and Chris Armen, “Toward 
Machine Ethics: Implementing Two Action-based Ethical Theories,” in Machine Ethics, Papers 
form AAAI Fall Symposium, 2005, eds. Michael Anderson, Suzan Leigh Anderson, and Chris 
Armen, Technical Report FS-05-06 (Menlo Park, CA: Association for the Advancement of 
Artificial Intelligence, 2005), https://www.aaai.org/Library/Symposia/Fall/fs05-06.php; Michael 
Anderson, Suzan Leigh Anderson, and Chris Armen, “An Approach to Computing Ethics,” IEEE 
Intelligent Systems 21, no. 4 (2006): 65-63; Michael Anderson, and Suzan Leigh Anderson, 
“Machine Ethics: Creating an Ethical Intelligent Agent,” AI Magazine 28, no. 4 (2007): 15-26; 
Michael Anderson, and Suzan Leigh Anderson, “The Status of Machine Ethics: A Report from 
the AAAI Symposium,” Minds & Machines 17 (2007): 1-10. See also Michael Anderson, and 
Susan Leigh Anderson, eds., Machine Ethics (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011).
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of behavior that would entail ethical concerns and the speed with which 
autonomous systems capable of such behavior would be upon us.
Given this, the original purpose of the project was to give evidence that
1. autonomous systems need not be fully realized to exhibit 
behavior of ethical concern
2. ethics is representable and computable
3. the behavior of autonomous systems can be guided by ethical 
principles
As all AI is machine-based, we see little difference between AI Ethics and 
Machine Ethics other than its focus on issues raised by the systems recently 
developed by deep learning. As such systems arise in a black-box fashion from 
non-vetted data, it is difficult to see how these issues will be resolved and, 
ultimately, how we will ever be able to guarantee ethical behavior from these 
systems. Unless such a guarantee can be given, it does not seem likely that 
such systems will be acceptable. That said, given the surprising proliferation 
of autonomous systems in general, we believe the tenets of the Machine 
Ethics project are more relevant than ever.
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: Having previously argued for the 
expediency of the Machine Ethics research program, you have pointed out 
that one of the advantages that machines have over humans in the process 
of moral judgment is the feature of impartiality (non-bias).2 Due to their 
mechanical nature, AI agents are impartial, namely they judge without any 
bias, unlike humans who tend to be partial, since for example they often decide 
while being emotionally charged. However, if at some point, in the future, the 
initial goal of AI is achieved and machines acquire humanlike cognition, do 
you think they will preserve the advantage of impartiality over humans? Such 
a question outlines a possible conflict between the basic research objective 
of AI – specifically the creation of truly intelligent machines – and the goal of 
Machine Ethics research program regarding the creation of impartial ethical 
advisors and impartial explicit ethical agents. This possible conflict of the 
basic research goals of AI and Machine Ethics can also be seen in relation 
to the vision of creating super-intelligent machines. We say this thinking of 
Daniel Dennett, who refers to Nietzsche, saying that delusion and deception 
are characteristics of human nature thus only such a nature can understand 
2 Michael Anderson, Susan Leigh Anderson, and Chris Armen, “An Approach to Computing 
Ethics,” IEEE Intelligent Systems 21, no. 4 (2006): 65-63; Michael Anderson, and Suzan Leigh 
Anderson, “Machine Ethics: Creating an Ethical Intelligent Agent,” AI Magazine 28, no. 4 
(2007): 15-26; Michael Anderson, and Suzan Leigh Anderson, “Robot Be Good,” Scientific 
American 303, no. 4 (2010): 72-77.
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ethics.3 Driven by Dennett’s position, we think that if the machines reach in 
the future a kind of super-intelligence that will be impartial at the same time, 
they may not be interested in ethics at all or will not justify its usefulness. 
Susan Leigh Anderson: I have long been concerned with the bias of AI 
researchers towards trying to reproduce human cognition and human 
intelligence, and even our ethical values. We are not ideal beings! We can 
do better than model human behavior as we create autonomous AI entities. 
Michael Anderson: Given the initial reticence to see Machine Ethics in any 
light other than one of science fiction, we purposefully limited the scope of 
our research to immediate, pragmatic concerns with the hope of convincing 
some of the scientific fact of its need. It remains to be seen whether “super-
intelligence” will make the same leap from fiction to fact. That said, if it does 
in fact make such a leap, you can be sure if we have given little thought to 
how we would like such machines to behave towards us, it is likely that we 
will have little say in how they actually do.
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: Would you say that the idea for a Machine 
Ethics, finally the idea that ethics is computable, could be thought of as part of 
the philosophical tradition supporting that thought equals calculation? Would 
you consider yourselves as belonging to the same line of thinkers like Hobbes,4 
Leibniz,5 and more recently Turing,6 McCulloch and Pitts,7 or Newell and Simon?8
3 Daniel Dennett, “When Hal Kills, Who’s to Blame? Computer Ethics,” in Hal’s Legacy: 2001’s 
Computer as Dream and Reality, ed. David G. Stork, 351-365 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
4 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical 
and Civil, ed. A. R. Waller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1904).
5 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Dissertatio de arte combinatoria (Paris: Hachette Livre-BNF, 
2018); Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason,” in 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 1989). 
6 Alan Mathison Turing, “Intelligent Machinery,” in Machine Intelligence 5, ed. B. Meltzer, 
and D. M. Michie, 3-23 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969); Alan Mathison Turing, 
“Computing, Machinery and Intelligence,” Mind 59 (1950): 433-460. See also Alan Mathison 
Turing, “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem,” in 
The Essential Turing: Seminal Writings in Computing, Logic, Philosophy, Artificial Intelligence, 
and Artificial Life, ed. Jack B. Copeland, 58-90 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) – see 
especially p. 59.
7 Warren S. McCulloch, and Walter H. Pitts, “A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in 
Nervous Activity,” Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 5 (1943): 115-33. 
8 Allen Newell, and Herbert Alexander Simon, Current Developments in Complex Information 
Processing: Technical Report P-850 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1956); Allen 
Newell, and John Crosley Shaw, “Programming the Logic Theory Machine,” in IRE-AIEE-
ACM ‘57 (Western): Papers Presented at the February 26-28, 1957, Western Joint Computer 
Conference: Techniques for Reliability, 230-240 (New York: Association for Computing 
Machinery, 1957); Allen Newell, and Herbert Alexander Simon, “The Logic Theory Machine: 
A Complex Information-Processing System,” IRE Transactions on Information Theory 2, no. 3 
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Susan Leigh Anderson: While I believe that ethics is, in principle, computable 
(and we have been trying to demonstrate this), I’m not sure that I would go so 
far as to say that all thought is computable. What about artistic ideas?
Michael Anderson: It seems a bit of a stretch from “having machines behave 
ethically towards us” – the stated goal of our Machine Ethics project – and 
“all thought is calculation,” don’t you think?
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: During the process of ethical decision 
making one is likely to find oneself facing a condition known in Ethical 
Philosophy as ‘conflict of duties.’ Is it possible that in trying to tackle a conflict 
of moral duties in a computational basis, one might find oneself facing a 
kind of a ‘Halting Problem?’9 Could it be possible that the explicit ethical 
agent would be trapped in a never-ending calculation, maybe an infinite loop 
going back and forth between two opposing duties? In your opinion, are there 
any major difficulties in the fulfillment of the Machine Ethics endeavor – for 
instance difficulties related to the ontology, the very nature of calculation 
or of ethics?
Michael Anderson: Clearly time is of the essence in such decision making 
and, if competing duties are so closely tied, simply choosing either when time 
is up would seem a sufficient means to end deliberation. Minsky, in a private 
conversation, once said to Susan (in his inimitable way) “Ethics is what you do 
when you run out of time.” Just as clearly, hundreds of years of reflection on 
ethical matters has laid bare a myriad of difficulties that are likely to plague 
efforts in Machine Ethics as well. That said, perhaps the constrained domain 
and new perspective of the effort might shed new light on some of these 
difficulties.
(1956): 61-79; Allen Newell, and Herbert Alexander Simon, “GPS-A Program that Simulates 
Human Thought,” in Lernende Automaten, ed. Heinz Billing, 109-124 (Münich: Oldenburg, 
1961); Allen Newell, John Crosley Shaw, and Herbert Alexander Simon, “Element of a Theory 
of Human Problem Solving,” Psychological Review 65 (1958): 151-166; Allen Newell, and 
Herbert Alexander Simon, “Computing Science as Empirical Enquiry: Symbols and Search,” 
Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery 19 (1976): 113-126; Allen 
Newell, “Physical Symbol Systems,” Cognitive Science 4 (1980): 135-183.
9 Alan Mathison Turing, “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the 
Entschiedungsproblem,” Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society Series 2, no. 42 
(1937): 230-265, reprinted in The Essential Turing: Seminal Writings in Computing, Logic, 
Philosophy, Artificial Intelligence, and Artificial Life, ed. Jack Copeland, 58-90 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004); Alan Mathison Turing, “On Computable Numbers, with an Application 
to the Entscheidungsproblem. A Correction,” Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 
43 (1938): 544-546; Martin Davis, Computability and Unsolvability (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1958), 70. See also Stephen Cole Kleene, Introduction to Metamathematics (Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, 1952), especially Chapter 13: “Computable Functions,” and Marvin Minsky, 
Computation: Finite and Infinite Machines (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), specifically chapter 
8, Section 8.2: “Unsolvability of the Halting Problem.” 
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Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: Persisting a little longer on the issue of 
‘conflict of duties,’ we would like you to comment on a related possibility. We 
are referring specifically to the case where the machine would have to choose 
between self-preservation (e.g. the search for vital resources) and continuing 
to fulfill the principles of a human-centered ethic (e.g. the principles of serving 
human well-being). Could this conflict of duties be averted by programming 
rules such as Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics?10 Susan has been critical of 
them in the past, commenting that they could not be a satisfactory basis for 
Machine Ethics.11 Could you tell us a few words about this claim while also 
suggesting an alternative for facing the above mentioned conflict of duties?
Susan Leigh Anderson: There are a number of problems with Asimov’s Laws 
as a basis for Machine Ethics. Roger Clarke12 has pointed out that there are 
a number of inconsistencies and ambiguities in the laws. Also, it could allow 
humans to abuse entities that resemble humans in form, leading to finding 
it easy to abuse humans as well. Most significantly, from our perspective, 
a hierarchical ethical duty theory is unsatisfactory because, in agreement 
with W.D. Ross, we believe that all ethical duties should be viewed as prima 
facie. That is, although all relevant ethical duties should be considered, none 
should be viewed as being absolute, as the top duty in a hierarchical ordering 
of duties would be. Each one could be overridden, on occasion, by another 
duty/duties that would be stronger in a particular situation. 
Michael Anderson: Asimov’s Laws were a landmark in ethical thinking 
concerning the actions of robots. This is true even when one considers they 
were devised simply as a device for generating fiction – Asimov seemed 
to spend more time delineating their weaknesses than championing their 
strengths. From a real-world perspective, one might question their insufficient 
specification, incomplete coverage of ethical duties, rigid hierarchal 
disposition, and required slave-like obedience.
Clearly, the robot has a duty to maintain itself in addition to its other ethical 
obligations towards its human user. And there is no simple answer as to 
whether it takes precedence when it conflicts with the other duties as this is a 
context dependent question. Sometimes it should, say when the robot’s other 
10 Isaac Asimov, “The Bicentennial Man,” in Philosophy and Science Fiction, ed. Michael Phillips, 
183-216 (Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books, 1984). 
11 Suzan Leigh Anderson, “Asimov’s ‘Three Laws of Robotics’ and Machine Metaethics,” AI and 
Society 22 (2007): 477-493; Suzan Leigh Anderson, “The Unacceptability of Asimov’s Three 
Laws of Robotics as a Basis for Machine Ethics,” in Machine Ethics, ed. Michael Anderson, 
and Suzan Leigh Anderson, 285-296 (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011). 
12 Roger Clarke, “Asimov’s Laws of Robotics: Implications for Information Technology. Part I,” 
Computer 26, no. 12 (1993): 53-61; Roger Clarke, “Asimov’s Laws of Robotics: Implications 
for Information Technology. Part II,” Computer 27, no. 1 (1994): 57-66.
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duties are not as pressing, and sometimes it shouldn’t, say when great harm 
might befall its human user if the robot tends to its needs rather than hers. Our 
work in machine ethics has shown how we might tease out the relationships 
between duties and how to use this information to drive a robot’s behavior: 
abstract principles of conflict resolution from agreed upon cases and use 
these principles to order actions in terms of their ethical preference.
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: Bostrom, Yudkowsky and others 
talk about the so-called Value Loading Problem,13 namely the problem of 
how to make machines understand and adopt the values and goals of the 
humans. However, in our view, even before we address this issue, there may 
exist another question that we have to answer. Specifically, if one approaches 
the concept of autonomy in Kantian terms,14 then arises the question of 
whether we ought (here, in terms of an ethical “ought”) to be concerned with 
the Value Loading Problem at all. More specifically, dealing with the Value 
Loading Problem implies the imposition of certain values on the machines (i.e 
human-centered values, generally values of our own choice etc.). However, 
this would be against the ethical principle of respecting the autonomy of 
others. Thus, as human AI developers, we may be faced with the following 
moral dilemma: Solving the Value Loading Problem to satisfy human goals 
and ensuring the survival of the human species, or staying consistent with our 
ethical principle of respect for the autonomy of others?15 Do you think this 
dilemma is valid or is it a pseudo-problem? If it is valid, do you see any way 
out of it?
Susan Leigh Anderson: As I mentioned previously, I don’t think we should 
build all human values into autonomous machines, since humans are prone to 
unethical behavior. We can, and should, do better than that. Nevertheless, 
until these entities demonstrate that they have the qualities necessary to 
13 Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014); Eliezer Yudkowsky, “Complex Value Systems in Friendly AI,” in Artificial General 
Intelligence, edited by Jürgen Schmidhuber, Kristinn R. Thórisson, and Moshe Looks, 388-
393 (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2011). See also Eliezer Yudkowsky, “The Value Loading 
Problem,” EDGE, July 12, 2021, https://www.edge.org/response-detail/26198; Nate Soares, 
“The Value Learning Problem,” in Artificial Intelligence, Safety and Security, ed. Roman V. 
Yampolskiy, 89-97 (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2019).
14 Immanuel Kant, The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Allen W. Wood (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), for instance see 4: 435-6, 4:440 and 4:447; 
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), see 5:132, also 5:29.
15 Here, the Value Loading Problem concerns one of the two conflicting duties of the human-
developer. It lies at one end of the dilemma, as it has to do with the satisfaction of human 
goals. The other end is what concerns the respect of the autonomy of others, in this case the 
AI agents.
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be considered to be full ethical agents (that we, following James Moor,16 
distinguish from being explicit ethical agents, which is what we attempt 
to create), we don’t have to worry about respecting their autonomy. It is 
perfectly appropriate that, since they are designed to be in the service of 
human beings (and, perhaps, animals as well), they should be designed to 
respect their rights.
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: There are many who argue that 
creating a literally ethical machine is practically impossible and ultimately 
unachievable17 and that we should come to terms with the assumption that 
at least at an early stage, the basic ethical values will eventually be loaded. 
Drawing on the theory of W. D. Ross,18 as well as the Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics19 by Beauchamp and Childress, you propose that an ethical machine 
should possess prima facie duties.20 Do you think that there could be a specific 
ethical theory that would effectively cover all the possible ethically-laden 
circumstances (all the cases in need of an ethical analysis) that an AI agent 
will have to deal with? The danger here is that the agent may operate on the 
basis of certain principles that will prove to be effective in some cases and 
ineffective – even dangerous – in others. Furthermore, would a finite set of 
principles be sufficient for the AI agent to recognize the ethically relevant and 
16 James H. Moor, “The Nature, Importance, and Difficulty of Machine Ethics,” IEEE Intelligent 
Systems 21, no. 4 (2006): 18-21.
17 Roman Yampolskiy, “Artificial Intelligence Safety Engineering: Why Machine Ethics is 
a Wrong Approach,” in Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Studies in Applied 
Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, ed. Vincent Müller, 389-396 (Berlin, Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2013).
18 W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930).
19 T. L. Beauchamp, and J. F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 1979).
20 For instance see Anderson, Anderson, and Armen, C., “An Approach;” Michael Anderson, and 
Susan Leigh Anderson, “MedEthEx: A Prototype Medical Ethics Advisor,” Proceedings of the 
21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the Eighteenth Innovative Applications 
of Artificial Intelligence Conference, 1759-1765 (Boston, MA: AAAI Press, 2006); Anderson, 
and Anderson, “Machine Ethics: Creating;” Anderson, “Asimov’s Three Laws;” Anderson, 
and Anderson, “Robot Be Good;” Anderson, “Machine Metaethics;” Michael Anderson, and 
Suzan Leigh Anderson, “A Prima Facie Duty Approach to Machine Ethics: Machine Learning of 
Features of Ethical Dilemmas, Prima Facie Duties, and Decision Principles through a Dialogue 
with Ethicists,” in Machine Ethics, ed. Michael Anderson, and Suzan Leigh Anderson, 476-
492 (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Suzan Leigh Anderson, 
“Philosophical Concerns with Machine Ethics,” in Machine Ethics, ed. Michael Anderson, and 
Suzan Leigh Anderson, 162-167 (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011); Suzan Leigh Anderson, and Michael Anderson, “Towards a Principle-based Healthcare 
Agent,” in Machine Medical Ethics, ed. S. van Rysewyk, and M. Pontier, 67-77 (Cham: Springer, 
2015); Michael Anderson, and Suzan Leigh Anderson, “Toward Ensuring Ethical Behavior from 
Autonomous Systems: A Case-supported Principle-based Paradigm,” Industrial Robot 42, no. 
4 (2015): 324-331.
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prominent features of every possible circumstance? In other words, would this 
finite set of ethical principles be sufficient for the AI agent to recognize every 
ethically-laden case as such? There is a risk here that there will be cases that 
the agent will fail to recognize as ethically-laden (i.e. circumstances asking 
for an ethical analysis). In addition to the ethical principles themselves, this 
problem could also arise regarding the criteria for applying these principles. 
Again, the finite nature of these criteria could make the AI agent fail in 
the recognition of a situation as ethically-laden (i.e. failure to recognize a 
situation in which the agent should apply its ethical principles). One might, 
probably, argue that this is a version of the Frame Problem of AI21 applied in 
the case of ethical functioning of the AI agents; or, as we could say, a Moral 
Frame Problem of AI. With this in mind, the above question can be phrased as 
such: Is it possible for a specific ethical theory, therefore a finite set of ethical 
principles, to successfully address the Moral Frame Problem of AI?
Susan Leigh Anderson: Two points need to be mentioned here: The first is that, 
for the foreseeable future, autonomous AI entities are likely to be developed 
to function in particular domains, with a limited number of ethically relevant 
features, and corresponding prima facie duties to be considered, leading to a 
decision principle that can be learned from select ethical dilemmas that are likely 
to be encountered in those domains. Second, we don’t believe that there are 
situations where no ethically relevant features, and corresponding duties, are 
present when the autonomous AI entity interacts with humans. Those who reject 
this position tend to think of ethical dilemmas as involving significant harm to a 
human, but the ethical perspective involves determining the best action that could 
be performed in particular situations. There are always better and worse actions 
to be considered. So the AI entity, on our view, never has to determine whether a 
particular situation is an ethically significant one or not. All of its actions should 
be subsumed under the learned ethical principle, no matter how trivial.
Michael Anderson: It seems that the problem described applies to all 
autonomously-acting agents, including human beings. Until we develop 
21 John McCarthy, and Patrick J. Hayes, “Some Philosophical Problems from the Standpoint 
of Artificial Intelligence,” In Machine Intelligence, vol. 4, ed. Bernard Meltzer, and Donald 
M. Michie, 463-502 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969). See also Daniel Dennett, 
Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), 
125; Daniel Dennett, “Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of AI,” in Minds, Machines and 
Evolution: Philosophical Studies, ed. C. Hoockway, 129-152 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984); Hubert Lederer Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial 
Reason (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 289; Jerry Alan Fodor, The Modularity of Mind 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), 114; Zenon W. Pylyshyn, ed., The Robot’s Dilemma: 
The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1987); Michael Wheeler, 
“Cognition in Context: Phenomenology, Situated Robotics, and the Frame Problem,” 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16, no. 3 (2008): 323-349; Michael Wheeler, 
Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).
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“philosopher robots,” and, in the vein of human beings, a race of philosophers, 
it seems that autonomous agents are doomed by their finite capabilities to 
make mistakes and, hopefully, learn from them. That said, it seems likely that 
the set of ethically relevant features, and hence the corresponding duties to 
minimize or maximize them, is not infinite. In fact, Utilitarians might argue 
that net good is the only ethically relevant feature. While that may or not 
be the case, we argue that a finer gradation (and hence greater number) of 
ethically relevant features may be needed to help illuminate the reasoning 
behind ethical decision making.
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: If at least for the time being we cannot 
avoid the (even partial) ‘loading’ of some basic or initial moral values to the 
AI agents, then shouldn’t this process of regulating ‘value loading’ involve 
the end-users and not only the AI developers? In other words, shouldn’t the 
ordinary citizens have a say in the choice of those principles? Additionally, 
shouldn’t each cultural background regarding morality be taken into account? 
We saw in a very interesting MIT experiment the different ways in which 
different cultures react to the ‘trolley problem’ that came to the fore with 
the evolution of smart cars.22 The question is whether the design of an ethical 
machine should follow the demand for the democratization of technology 
and technical design23 24 – or even a culture based technical design.25 Recently, 
you have also proposed a framework promoting public participation as part 
22 Edmond Awad, Sohan Dsouza, Richard Kim, Jonathan Schulz, Joseph Henrich, Azim Shariff, 
Jean-François Bonnefon, and Iyad Rahwan, “The Moral Machine Experiment,” Nature 563, no. 
7729 (2018): 59-64; Jean-Francois Bonnefon, Azim Shariff, and Iyad Rahwan, “The Social 
Dilemma of Autonomous Vehicles,” Science 352, no. 6293 (2016): 1573-1576; Edmond 
Awad, Sohan Dsouza, Azim Shariff, Iyad Rahwan, and Jean-Francois Bonnefon, “Universals and 
Variations in Moral Decisions Made in 42 Countries by 70,000 Participants,” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 5 (2020): 2332-2337. 
23 Andrew Feenberg, “Subversive Rationalization: Technology, Power, and Democracy,” in 
Technology and the Politics of Knowledge, ed. Andrew Feenberg, and Alastair Hannay, 3-11 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995); Andrew Feenberg, Questioning 
Technology (London, New York: Routledge, 1999); Carl Mitcham, Thinking through Technology: 
The Path between Engineering and Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); 
Langdon Winner, “Technè and Politeia: The Technical Constitution of Society,” in Philosophy 
of Technology, ed. Paul T. Dubrin, and Friedrich Rapp, 97-111 (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: 
D. Reidel, 1983); Langdon Winner, “Citizen Virtues in a Technological Order,” Inquiry 35, nos. 
3-4 (1992): 341-361.
24 The question regarding the democratization of Technology is closely related to the notions 
of inclusion, fairness and transparency, which seem to have become popular topics in the AI 
research literature. See The 2019 AI Index Annual Report, Stanford University Human Centered 
AI, Chapter 8: “Societal Considerations,” especially pages 149-151.
25 Karen Hao, “Should a Self-driving Car Kill the Baby or the Grandma? Depends on where 
You’re from,” MIT Technology Review, October 14, 2018, https://www.technologyreview.
com/2018/10/24/139313/a-global-ethics-study-aims-to-help-ai-solve-the-self-driving-
trolley-problem/.
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of a process – or as you call it, a “tool” – for the formulation of principles 
to be loaded to the machines.26 Do you generally agree with an inclusive 
approach with regards to the Machine Ethics research program?
Susan Leigh Anderson: I have argued that, in general, applied ethicists (with 
knowledge of the domains in question) should be involved in learning the 
ethical principles, from the ethically relevant features and correlative prima 
facie duties that should govern the behavior of autonomous AI entities in 
specific domains. They have an expertise that others lack. But I have also 
accepted (after discussions with Edmond Awad) that there is an ethically 
justifiable place for the opinions of the general public concerning emerging 
technologies, for instance, driverless cars: Since there has been push-back 
from the public about allowing driverless cars in large part because of a 
death in Arizona by a driverless car and concern that there are bound to 
be situations, even with improved sensors, where the behavior of driverless 
cars could result in deaths, there needs to be a way for the public to weigh 
in on this possibility to allow for the acceptance of driverless cars, which 
would certainly result in fewer deaths than with human drivers who are often 
distracted, tired or impaired. 
Until recently Michael and I have maintained that we didn’t think that 
machines should be permitted to function autonomously in domains where 
life-and-death decisions need to be made, because they are controversial. 
Such decisions are controversial because they are often emotionally driven 
for ordinary people and even ethicists disagree about how to weigh the 
various ethically relevant factors involved. The case of driverless cars is 
very different, I now see. A central ethical concern for any action or policy 
must be causing the least harm. This is universally agreed upon. It seems 
clear that having only driverless cars would result in less harm than having 
only human drivers. If there were some way to placate the public’s concerns 
about when driverless cars behavior might lead to human deaths, leading to 
allowing them, it should be taken seriously. Encouraging the public to have 
a say in what driverless cars should do in various possible scenarios where 
death might result, making the results known and adopting the majority’s 
view (probably for a particular society), might just be enough for the public 
to accept driverless cars, which is likely to lead to fewer deaths overall.
And, actually, it is consistent with our long held position that only humans 
should make life-and-death decisions since, although the cars function 
autonomously, the decisions they make were determined by humans who 
26 Edmond Awad, Michael Anderson, Suzan Leigh Anderson, and Beishui Liao, “An Approach for 
Combining Ethical Principles with Public Opinion to Guide Public Policy,” Artificial Intelligence 
287 (2020): article 103349.
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gave them rules to follow. Humans will be held accountable if the results 
are questioned. I foresee challenges to the majority’s recommended policies 
as time goes by, leading perhaps to new policies approved by the majority, 
just as laws in this country are changed over time, hopefully leading to more 
ethically acceptable ones as ethicists and others weigh in. 
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: In several publications you refer to 
the creation of ethical advisors such as the bio-medical advisor MedEthEx.27 
As mentioned before, you suggest that the most appropriate way for these 
advisors to operate is based on the Principles of Biomedical Ethics28 by Tom 
Beauchamp and James Childress. Can you tell us a bit more about your 
proposal? 
Susan Leigh Anderson: We began testing our approach to representing ethics 
in a machine, and generating ethical decision principles from considering 
specific cases of ethical dilemmas, by using a general type of ethical dilemma 
often faced by medical practitioners, where the ethics is clear. Medical 
Ethics is quite well established and there is agreement on using Beauchamp 
and Childress’s principles (prima facie duties, in our view, since there is no 
decision principle to resolve cases where they give conflicting advice) to 
frame discussions. 
Here is the common type of ethical dilemma we considered: A health care 
worker has recommended a particular treatment for her competent adult 
patient and the patient has rejected that treatment option. Should the health 
care worker try again to change the patient’s mind or accept the patient’s 
decision as final? The dilemma arises because, on the one hand, the health 
care worker may not want to risk upsetting the patient by challenging his 
decision; on the other hand, the health care worker may have concerns about 
why the patient is refusing the treatment. Three of the four principles/duties 
of Biomedical Ethics are likely to be satisfied or violated in dilemmas of this 
type: the duty of respect for autonomy, the duty of nonmaleficence and the 
duty of beneficence. The system accepts a range of values for each of the 
duties from –2 to +2, where -2 represents a serious violation of the duty, 
-1 a less serious violation, 0 indicates that the duty is neither satisfied nor 
violated, +1 indicates a minimal satisfaction of the duty and +2 a maximal 
satisfaction of the duty.
Through inductive logic, after considering several cases giving reasons why 
the patient was rejecting the recommended treatment where the answer is 
clear as to whether the patient’s decision should be accepted or challenged, 
27 Anderson, and Anderson, “MedEthEx.”
28 Tom Lamar Beauchamp, and James Franklin Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1979).
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the system learned this principle: A health care worker should challenge a 
patient’s decision if it is not fully autonomous and either there is any violation 
of the duty of nonmaleficence or there is a severe violation of the duty of 
beneficence. This philosophically interesting result gives credence to Rawls’ 
Method of Reflective Equilibrium.29 We have, through abstracting a principle 
from intuitions about particular cases and then testing that principle on 
further cases, come up with a plausible principle that tells us which action is 
correct when specific duties pull in different directions in a particular ethical 
dilemma. Furthermore, the principle that has been abstracted supports an 
insight of Ross’s that violations of the duty of nonmaleficence should carry 
more weight than violations of the duty of beneficence.
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: However, in addition to the question 
“What ethical principles should the ΑΙ ethical advisor, or the explicit agent, 
apply?” the question “To which entities should the AI agent apply these 
criteria?” arises as well. Some would say that this question seems to be gaining 
in importance considering the possibility of developing in the future machines 
with a significant degree of autonomy that will be able to interact with their 
environment in a more ‘holistic’ way. In such a case, we also need to face 
the question of “How will the AI agent decide a) which of its surrounding 
entities have moral standing and therefore need a moral treatment from the 
AI agent?, and b) what exactly this moral standing would involve?” Is the 
issue of defining criteria for the attribution of moral status to others crucial 
for the Machine Ethics research program? If so, are there any satisfactory 
criteria that an AI agent could effectively apply for the attribution of moral 
status to its surrounding entities?
Susan Leigh Anderson: In my view sentience is the quality an entity should 
possess to have moral standing, because only an entity possessing this quality 
would care what happens to it. But it is difficult to detect whether this quality 
is present in an entity other than oneself. And it isn’t necessary to possess 
this quality for it to be important that we treat an entity as if it has moral 
standing. I have argued – using Kant’s argument for why we should treat 
animals well, where he maintained that even though they don’t have rights 
themselves (now debatable), because they resemble us we should treat them 
as if they have rights lest it lead to a slippery slope where it becomes easier to 
29 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1971). For subsequent refinements and reappraisals of the theoretical construct of 
the Reflective Equilibrium see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 2nd edition (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), and John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: 
Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985): 223-251. For the 
distinction between narrow and wide Reflective Equilibrium see John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: 
A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 31.
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mistreat other humans – that any entity that resembles us in form or function 
should be treated as if it has moral standing.
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: Let us insist for a moment on the 
issue of the criteria for the attribution of moral status. From time to time in 
some of your papers you have considered the question of whether an explicit 
ethical agent should follow a set of ethical principles that will involve the 
fact that the agent itself has a moral standing. Namely, whether the agent 
should ‘consider’ (or consider) itself as an entity with moral standing.30 Could 
you please tell us more about the significance and the importance of this 
question?
Susan Leigh Anderson: I don’t think it’s important to determine its own 
status in order to decide how it should treat others.
Michael Anderson: I can imagine that one might draw the wrong conclusion 
about our stance towards this question when one considers that we advocate 
that such an agent has a duty to maintain itself. I would argue that this does 
not in fact pertain to an attribution of moral status to the agent but instead 
is concerned with making sure that the agent maintains its capacity to fulfill 
its other duties towards its user.
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: In addition to the above question 
as to whether the explicit ethical agent ‘considers’ (or considers) itself as 
an entity with moral standing, many AI researchers also reasonably pose 
the question of whether we should consider the explicit ethical agent (and 
generally any AI agent) as an entity with moral standing.31 Should we bother 
with the attribution of moral status to AI entities? If so, what do you think the 
criteria are that an explicit ethical agent (and, more generally, an AI agent) 
should meet in order for moral status to be attributed to it? For example, 
some people think that an ethical Turing Test will be enough to attribute 
moral status to machines.32 Do you think accepting this view is the only way 
30 Anderson, “Asimov’s Three Laws.” 
31 For instance, Luciano Floridi, and J. W. Sanders, “On the Morality of Artificial Agents,” 
Minds and Machines 14 (2004): 349-379; Christian Hugo Hoffmann, and Benjamin Hahn, 
“Decentered Ethics in the Machine Era and Guidance for AI Regulation,” AI & Society 35, no. 
3 (2009): 635-644; David Levy, “The Ethical Treatment of Artificially Conscious Robots,” 
International Journal of Social Robotics 1, no. 3 (2009): 209-216; Bertram F. Malle, Thapa 
Stuti Magar, and Matthias Scheutz, “AI in the Sky: How People Morally Evaluate Human and 
Machine Decisions in a Lethal Strike Dilemma,” in Robotics and Well-Being, ed. Maria Aldinhas 
Ferreira, João Silva Sequeira, Gurvinder Singh Virk, Mohammad Tokhi Osman, and Ender E. 
Kadar, 111-133 (Cham: Springer, 2019); Robert Sparrow, “Killer Robots,” Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 24, no. 1 (2007): 62-77. See also Jonathan Owen, and Richard Osley, “Bill of 
Rights for Abused Robots: Experts Draw up an Ethical Charter to Prevent Humans Exploiting 
Machines,” The Independent, September 17, 2011, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/
science/bill-of-rights-for-abused-robots-5332596.html.
32 Colin Allen, Varner Gary, and Zinser Jason, “Prolegomena to Any Future Artificial Moral 
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to go? You have also commented33 on criteria like Jeremy Bentham’s and 
Peter Singers’ criterion of sentience34 – which you have also mentioned earlier 
in our discussion – Immanuel Kant’s criterion of self-consciousness,35 Michael 
Tooley’s criterion of desire (for a moral right),36 and Mary Anne Warren’s 
criterion of emotionality.37 Do you find any flaws in these criteria?38 For 
example, does the Other Minds Problem pose a threat to the feasibility of 
applying such criteria, namely criteria of an internalist kind?39 Furthermore, 
what do you think the moral status of AI agents could finally be? 
Susan Leigh Anderson: As I mentioned earlier, answering your question 
regarding the criteria that an AI agent could effectively apply for the attribution 
of moral status to its surrounding entities, given the Problem of Other Minds, 
we may never know whether an autonomous AI entity possesses the quality 
essential to having moral standing, but I have argued that we should treat it (if 
it resembles us, or an animal, in form or function) as if it does.
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: With your work you have opened a 
new path for the treatment and resolution of the ethically-laden biomedical 
Agent,” Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12 (2000): 151-261; 
Robert Sparrow, “The Turing Triage Test,” Ethics and Information Technology 6 (2004): 201-
213, especially 204.
33 Anderson, “Asimov’s Three Laws.” 
34 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J. Burns, 
and H. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1789), especially Chapter 17: “Boundary around Penal 
Jurisprudence.” Also Peter Singer, “All Animals Are Equal,” in Animal Ethics: Past and Present 
Perspectives, ed. Evangelos D. Protopapadakis, 163-178 (Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2012); Peter 
Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals (New York: New York 
Review of Books, 1975); Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). 
35 Immanuel Kant, “Our Duties to Animals,” in his Lectures on Ethics, trans. L. Infield, 239-241 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1963). 
36 Michael Tooley, “In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide,” In The Abortion Controversy: A 
Reader, ed. Luis P. Pojman, and Francis J. Beckwith, 186-213 (Boston, MA: Jones & Bartlett, 
1994). 
37 Mary Anne Warren, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,” in Contemporary Moral 
Problems, ed. J. White, 144-155 (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thompson Learning, 2003).
38 For an analysis of the flaws in the proposed criteria regarding the attribution of moral status 
to AI entities, see Alkis Gounaris, and George Kosteletos, “Licensed to Kill: Autonomous 
Weapons as Persons and Moral Agents,” in Personhood, ed. Dragan Prole, and Goran Rujiević, 
137-189 (Novi Sad: The NKUA Applied Philosophy Research Lab Press, 2020).
39 For the way in which the Other Minds Problem could enter the discussion of AI Ethics and 
the application of moral status to the AI agents see D. Gunkel, The Machine Question: Critical 
Perspectives on AI, Robots and Ethics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012); C. Hoffmann, and B. 
Hahn, “Decentered Ethics in the Machine Era and Guidance for AI Regulation,” AI & Society 
35, no. 3 (2009): 635-644; D. Levy, “The Ethical Treatment of Artificially Conscious Robots,” 
International Journal of Social Robotics 1, no. 3 (2009): 209-216. 
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problems.40 Do you think bioethicists or philosophers in general should be 
concerned about their work in the future? Will the machines be able to replace 
them, at some point, completely? Could machines become the ‘philosophers’ 
of a new Plato’s Republic?
Susan Leigh Anderson: I do think that there is a possibility of there being 
more objectivity in machine decision-making, if properly designed; but new 
issues are bound to arise (conditions change) that would require up-dates. 
And an important philosophical question will never disappear: What gives our 
lives meaning? 
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: How much do you really think we 
are in danger from AI? Some argue that the cooperation of the AI and the 
Biotechnology fields will lead to new forms of intelligence in the near future.41 
What should we hope for and what should we fear about that? We see the 
media, pop writers like Harari,42 businessmen like Musk,43 and the academic 
community as well (e.g. Bostrom44 or Tegmark45 Institutes) holding a cautious 
40 Michael Anderson, and Susan Leigh Anderson, “MedEthEx: A Prototype Medical Ethics 
Advisor,” Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 
Eighteenth Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, 1759-1765 (Boston, 
MA: AAAI Press, 2006), http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/aaai/aaai2006.html#AndersonAA06; 
Michael Anderson, and Susan Leigh Anderson, “ETHEL: Toward a Principled Ethical Eldercare 
System,” Proceedings of the AAAI Fall Symposium: New Solutions to Old Problems. Technical 
Report FS-08-02 (Arlington, VA, 2008); Michael Anderson, and Susan Leigh Anderson, “Robot 
Be Good,” Scientific American 303, no. 4 (2010): 72-77. Also, Michael Anderson, and Susan 
Leigh Anderson, “A Prima Facie Duty Approach to Machine Ethics: Machine Learning of 
Features of Ethical Dilemmas, Prima Facie Duties, and Decision Principles through a Dialogue 
with Ethicists,” in Machine Ethics, ed. Michael Anderson, and Suzan Leigh Anderson, 476-492 
(New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Susan Leigh Anderson, and 
Michael Anderson, “Towards a Principle-Based Healthcare Agent,” in Machine Medical Ethics, 
ed. S. van Rysewyk, and M. Pontier, 67-77 (Cham: Springer, 2015).
41 Yuval Noah Harari, 21 Lessons for the 21st Century (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2018).
42 Nicholas Thompson, “Will Artificial Intelligence Enhance or Hack Humanity?” Wired, April 
20, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/will-artificial-intelligence-enhance-hack-humanity/.
43 Catherine Clifford, and Elon Musk: “Mark my Words – A.I. is far more Dangerous than 
Nukes.” CNBC, March 13, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/13/elon-musk-at-sxsw-a-i-
is-more-dangerous-than-nuclear-weapons.html; Gregory Wallace, “Elon Musk Warns against 
Unleashing Artificial Intelligence ‘Demon,’” CNN Business, October 26, 2014, https://money.
cnn.com/2014/10/26/technology/elon-musk-artificial-intelligence-demon/; Ricki Harris, “Elon 
Musk: Humanity Is a Kind of ‘Biological Boot Loader’ for AI,” Wired, January 9, 2019, https://
www.wired.com/story/elon-musk-humanity-biological-boot-loader-ai/.
44 For more, visit The Future of Humanity Institute, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/; Nick Bostrom, 
“Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority,” Global Policy 4, no. 1 (2013): 15-31.
45 For more, visit https://futureoflife.org/; Max Tegmark, “Benefit and Risks of Artificial 
Intelligence,” Future of Life Institute, https://futureoflife.org/background/benefits-risks-of-
artificial-intelligence/; Stuart Russell, et al., “Autonomous Weapons: Αn Open Letter from 
AI & Robotics Researchers,” Future of Life Institute, https://futureoflife.org/open-letter-
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and in some cases technophobic attitude in the face of developments. How 
could we distinguish the real risks from the pseudo-problems?
Susan Leigh Anderson: Whether we have to fear AI technology depends 
on how it is developed and by whom it is used. In itself it is neutral. If we 
develop AI entities on a human model, embodying negative human qualities 
(like self-centeredness, favoring one’s own group) and allow anyone to use 
them, they could become super weapons. This is why the field of Machine 
Ethics is so important. We have the opportunity to create ethical machines, 
non-threatening machines that not only aid us in many ways, but can also 
show us how we need to behave if we are to survive as a species.
Michael Anderson: For all the perils of doing so, I see no other option than 
trusting science. Yes, it has led us into dangers that we might not have faced 
if we had kept our blinders on but it has also been the shining light that 
has taken humanity out of the darkness, illuminating many mysteries of the 
universe. Given the risks humanity lives under, my hope for AI is that it might 
serve as a means for preserving intelligence. As it stands, this is currently 
only housed in human bodies – a vessel so fragile that it might be prudent 
to develop backup for it. Wouldn’t it be the ultimate tragedy if we were the 
only intelligent creatures in the universe and, through inaction, let our unique 
spark die out?
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: Let us now come to something even 
more current. In your opinion, which are the most prominent ethical challenges 
raised by the COVID-19 pandemic? Could Machine Ethics contribute in facing 
them? Could these ethical challenges be faced more successfully by an AI 
agent equipped with moral principles, than by human committees of doctors, 
epidemiologists, politicians and bioethicists? Finally, does this pandemic crisis 
provide the Machine Ethics research program with any lessons to be learned 
and used in similar crises in the future? What do you suggest so that the public 
would be prepared for such contributions by the AI agents?
Susan Leigh Anderson: What machines are good at (better than humans) is 
digesting a lot of data quickly: discovering connections, etc. Humans are still 
needed to input the data and ethicists are more likely to insist that the data 
is not skewed to gloss over ethical issues. For instance, one could just keep 
track of whether people are offered vaccines, just noting that fewer members 
of minority communities seem to be taking them, ignoring past legitimate 
concerns in these communities about taking vaccines and whether attempts 
have been made to educate them, or whether the means for notifying them 
autonomous-weapons/; Max Tegmark, Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence 
(New York: Knopf, 2017).
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of their chance to take the vaccine is likely to reach them (if through the 
internet: whether they have access to the internet and the skill at navigating 
it).
Michael Anderson: What machine ethics has to offer is consistent, impartial 
treatment of like cases. In the face of seemingly novel ethical challenges, it 
is hoped that this might prove useful in illuminating similarities to previous 
challenges thereby contributing to current ones.
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: In a recent publication,46 Michael 
among others, endorses the position that inclusive, interdisciplinary teams 
are needed to develop AI. What do you think that the role of philosophers is 
in such an endeavor? 
Michael Anderson: What seems to elude many is that there is expertise in 
ethics as there is in any academic discipline. This misapprehension seems to 
stem from the fact that people make “ethical” decisions daily and therefore 
have difficulty understanding why such expertise is needed. That said, doesn’t 
it seem obvious that those who have spent their research careers in a field 
might have greater insight into it? Clearly, the intuitive approach most bring 
to such decisions is riddled with partiality and inconsistency, not to mention a 
circumscribed understanding of the plethora of factors involved. The expertise 
ethicists bring to the table is necessary to help alleviate these shortcomings.
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: What remains to be achieved? Which 
would be the key concerns and the basic challenges of Machine Ethics in the 
future? Should we expect in the near future a safe, ethical and/or responsible 
AI?
Michael Anderson: Not a soothsayer but it’s pretty clear to me that 
autonomous systems are here to stay and it would be unwise to ignore their 
ethical tuition. Unfortunately, given its need for copious data and the dearth 
of such data in the domain of ethics, the silver bullet of deep learning does 
not seem to have much to offer to this issue. Where value judgements are 
involved, it seems that we are going to have to bite the bullet and do the hard 
work of determining just how we want such systems to behave towards us.
Alkis Gounaris & George Kosteletos: Susan, Michael, thank you for the 
extremely interesting discussion and we look forward to having you with us 
at our upcoming Me and AI: Human Concerns Artificial Minds Conference.
Susan Leigh & Michael Anderson: Thank you for your thought-provoking 
questions! Your conference could not come at a more opportune time!
46 Steve Taylor, et al., “Responsible AI – Key Themes, Concerns & Recommendations for 
European Research and Innovation,” Zenodo, July 2, 2018.
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